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The work we present in this paper initiated the formal study of fractional hedonic games, coalition formation
games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among
other settings, this covers situations in which players only distinguish between friends and non-friends and
desire to be in a coalition in which the fraction of friends is maximal. Fractional hedonic games thus not only
constitute a natural class of succinctly representable coalition formation games, but also provide an interesting
framework for network clustering. We propose a number of conditions under which the core of fractional
hedonic games is non-empty and provide algorithms for computing a core stable outcome. By contrast, we
show that the core may be empty in other cases, and that it is computationally hard in general to decide
non-emptiness of the core.
1 INTRODUCTION
Hedonic games present a natural and versatile framework to study the formal aspects of coalition
formationwhich has receivedmuch attention from both an economic and an algorithmic perspective.
This work was initiated by Drèze and Greenberg [1980], Banerjee et al. [2001], Cechlárová and
Romero-Medina [2001], and Bogomolnaia and Jackson [2002] and has sparked a lot of follow-
up work. A recent survey was provided by Aziz and Savani [2016]. In hedonic games, coalition
formation is approached from a game-theoretic angle. The outcomes are coalition structures—
partitions of the players—over which the players have preferences. Moreover, the players have
different individual or joint strategies at their disposal to affect the coalition structure to be formed.
Various solution concepts—such as the core, the strict core, and several kinds of individual stability—
have been proposed to analyze these games.
The characteristic feature of hedonic games is a non-externalities condition, according to which
every player’s preferences over the coalition structures are fully determined by the player’s prefer-
ences over coalitions he belongs to, and do not depend on how the remaining players are grouped.
Nevertheless, the number of coalitions a player can be a member of is exponential in the total
number of players, and the development and analysis of concise representations as well as interest-
ing subclasses of hedonic games are an ongoing concern in computer science and game theory.
Particularly prominent in this respect are representations in which the players are assumed to
entertain preferences over the other players, which are then systematically lifted to preferences over
coalitions [see, e.g., Alcalde and Revilla, 2004, Aziz et al., 2013, Banerjee et al., 2001, Bogomolnaia
and Jackson, 2002, Cechlárová and Romero-Medina, 2001, Dimitrov et al., 2006].
The work presented in this paper pertains to what we will call fractional hedonic games, a subclass
of hedonic games in which each player is assumed to have cardinal utilities or valuations over the
other players. These induce preferences over coalitions by considering the average valuation of the
members in each coalition. The higher this value, the more preferred the respective coalition is.
Previously the min, max, and sum operators have been used respectively for hedonic games based
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on worst players [Cechlárová and Romero-Medina, 2001], hedonic games based on best players [Cech-
lárová and Hajduková, 2002], and additively separable hedonic games [Banerjee et al., 2001]. Despite
the natural appeal of taking the average value, fractional hedonic games have enjoyed surprisingly
little attention prior to this work.1 Fractional hedonic games can be represented by a weighted
directed graph where the weight of edge (i, j) denotes the value player i has for player j. However,
we will be particularly interested in games that can be represented by undirected and unweighted
graphs. Thus, such games have symmetric valuations that only take the values 0 and 1. With the
natural graphical representation of these games, desirable outcomes for fractional hedonic games
also provide an interesting angle on network clustering.
Many natural economic problems can be modeled as fractional hedonic games. A particular
economic problem that we will consider is what we refer to as Bakers and Millers. Suppose there are
two types of players, bakers and millers, where individuals of the same type are competitors, trading
with players of the other type. Both types of players can freely choose the ‘neighborhood’ in which
to set up their enterprises; in the formal model, each neighborhood forms a coalition. Millers want
to be situated in a neighborhood with as many purchasing bakers relative to competing millers
as possible, so as to achieve a high price for the wheat they produce. On the other hand, bakers
seek as high a ratio of the number of millers to the number of bakers as possible, so as to keep the
price of wheat low and that of bread up. We show that these problems (which belong to the class of
fractional hedonic games) always admit a core stable partition. This result generalizes to situations
in which there are more than two types of player who want to keep the fraction of players of their
own type as low as possible. Our study of the Baker and Millers setting is inspired by Schelling’s
famous dynamic model of segregation [Schelling, 1971, 1978].
Another example concerns the formation of political parties. The valuation of two players for
each other may be interpreted as the extent to which their opinions overlap, perhaps measured by
the inverse of their distance in the political spectrum. In political environments, players need to
form coalitions and join parties to acquire influence. On the other hand, as parties become larger,
disagreement among their members will increase, making them susceptible to split-offs. Thus, one
could assume that players seek to maximize the average agreement with the members of their
coalition.
The contributions of the paper are as follows.
• We introduce and formally define fractional hedonic games and their graphical representa-
tion. We identify the subclass of games represented by undirected and unweighted graphs
(simple and symmetric fractional hedonic games) and discuss some of their properties.
• We show that fractional hedonic games may have an empty core, even in the simple
symmetric case. We give an example of such a game with 40 players. We leverage this
example to show that it is Σp2 -complete to decide whether a given simple symmetric
fractional hedonic game has non-empty core. Thus, finding a partition in the core is NP-
hard. It is also coNP-complete to verify whether a given partition is in the core.
• Based on the graphical representation of fractional hedonic games, we identify a number of
classes of graphs which induce games that admit a non-empty core. These include graphs
with degree at most two, forests, multi-partite complete graphs, bipartite graphs which
admit perfect matchings, and graphs with girth at least five. For each of these classes, we
also present polynomial-time algorithms to compute a core stable partition.
• We formulate the Bakers and Millers setting as a fractional hedonic game based on complete
bipartite (or, more generally, complete k-partite) graphs. We show that such games always
admit a non-empty strict core, and that the grand coalition is always stable. We characterize
1Hajduková [2006] first mentioned the possibility of using the average value in hedonic games but did not further analyze it.
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the partitions in the strict core, and give a polynomial time algorithm to compute a unique
finest partition in the strict core.
• We discuss how computing desirable outcomes in fractional hedonic games provides an
interesting game-theoretic perspective to community detection [see, e.g., Fortunato, 2010,
Newman, 2004] and network clustering.2
2 RELATEDWORK
Fractional hedonic games are related to additively separable hedonic games [see, e.g., Aziz et al.,
2013, Olsen, 2009, Sung and Dimitrov, 2010]. In both fractional hedonic games and additively
separable hedonic games, each player ascribes a cardinal value to every other player. In additively
separable hedonic games, utility in a coalition is derived by adding the values for the other players.
By contrast, in fractional hedonic games, utility in a coalition is derived by adding the values
for the other players and then dividing the sum by the total number of players in the coalition.
Although conceptually, additively separable and fractional hedonic games are similar, their formal
properties are quite different. As neither of the two models is obviously superior, this shows
how slight modeling decisions may affect the formal analysis. For example, in unweighted and
undirected graphs, the grand coalition is trivially core stable for additively separable hedonic games.
On the other hand, this is not the case for fractional hedonic games.3 A fractional hedonic game
approach to social networks with only non-negative weights may help detect like-minded and
densely connected communities. In comparison, when the network only has non-negative weights
for the edges, any reasonable solution for the corresponding additively separable hedonic game
returns the grand coalition, which is not informative.
The difference between additively separable and fractional hedonic games is reminiscent of some
issues in population ethics (see, e.g., Arrhenius et al., 2017), which concerns the evaluation of states
of the world with different numbers of individuals alive. Two prominent principles in population
ethics are total utilitarianism and average utilitarianism. The former claims that a state of the world
is better than another if it has a higher sum of individual utility, whereas the latter ranks states
by the average utility enjoyed by the individuals. Many of the paradoxes of population ethics
are analogous to properties of hedonic games. For example, average utilitarianism and fractional
hedonic games both suffer from the ‘Mere Addition Paradox’ [Parfit, 1984], according to which a
state of the world (resp., a coalition) can become less attractive if we add to it another positive-utility
player (but whose utility is lower than the current average). Note, however, that this paradox cannot
occur for simple and symmetric fractional hedonic games.
Olsen [2012] examined a variant of simple symmetric fractional hedonic games and investigated
the computation and existence of Nash stable partitions. In the games he considered, however,
every maximal matching is core stable and every perfect matching is a best possible outcome, even
if large cliques are present in the graph. By contrast, in our setting players have an incentive to
form large cliques.
Fractional hedonic games are different from, but related to, another class of hedonic games called
social distance games, which were introduced by Branzei and Larson [2011]. In social distance
games, a player’s utility from another player’s presence in a coalition is inversely proportional
to the distance between them in the subgraph induced by the coalition. In many situations, one
does not derive an additional benefit from friends of friends and may in fact prefer to minimize
2Clauset et al. [2004] discuss how social network analysis can be used to identify clusters of like-minded buyers and sellers
in amazon’s purchasing network.
3Examples of this kind show that there are additively separable hedonic games which cannot be represented as a fractional
hedonic game, and vice versa.
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the fraction of people one does not agree with or have direct connections with. In such scenarios,
fractional hedonic games are more suitable than social distance games.
Fractional hedonic games also exhibit some similarity with the segregation and status-seeking
models considered by Milchtaich and Winter [2002] and Lazarova and Dimitrov [2013]. Group
formation models based on types were first considered by Schelling [1971].
Independently from our work, Feldman et al. [2012] have also considered the hedonic games
framework as an approach to graph clustering. However, their research does not relate to core and
strict core stability and they study different classes of hedonic games.
Since their inception in the conference version of this paper [Aziz et al., 2014], fractional hedonic
games have already sparked some followup work. Aziz et al. [2015] took a welfare maximization
approach to fractional hedonic games and considered the complexity of finding partitions that
maximize utilitarian or egalitarian social welfare. Bilò et al. [2014] analyze fractional hedonic games
from the viewpoint of non-cooperative game theory. They show that Nash stable partitions may not
exist in the presence of negative valuations. Furthermore, they give bounds on the price of anarchy
and the price of stability. Bilò et al. [2015] and Kaklamanis et al. [2016] further examine the price of
(Nash) stability in simple symmetric fractional hedonic games, and Elkind et al. [2016] consider the
price of Pareto optimality. Brandl et al. [2015] presented computational results for various stability
concepts for fractional hedonic games. Peters and Elkind [2015] identified structural features for
various classes of hedonic games for which finding stable partitions is NP-hard. Their analysis
implies several hardness results for fractional hedonic games.
Liu andWei [2017] discuss simple symmetric fractional hedonic games (which they call popularity
games) as a model for the formation of socially cohesive groups. They argue that in social networks,
groups form based both on individual needs and desires, and on the group’s resistance to disruption.
Formally, individuals wish to maximize their popularity in the group (measured by the fraction of
the group that they are connected to in the network), while insisting that the group is core stable.
Liu and Wei [2017] identify several classes of networks in which the grand coalition is core stable
and give some necessary conditions in terms of structural cohesiveness measures. They also show
that it is NP-hard to decide whether the grand coalition is core stable in a given simple symmetric
fractional hedonic game, and present and evaluate some heuristics for this question.
Weese et al. [2017] use fractional hedonic games as a model of the formation of jurisdictions,
noting that the arrangement of political boundaries involves a tradeoff between efficiencies of
scale and of geographic heterogeneity. In examining the core of their weighted symmetric FHGs,
they randomly sampled such games and found that all their samples admit a non-empty core,
suggesting that the problem of non-existence of stable outcomes is not a problem in practice. They
also introduce a heuristic algorithm for finding a core stable outcome, which proceeds by repeatedly
searching for a blocking coalition (using integer programming) and myopically implementing the
corresponding coalitional deviation. They then apply this algorithm to specific games modeled
using historical data from Japan about political boundary changes, finding that their algorithm
always found a core solution and typically terminated within a few hours, even for games containing
approximately 1,000 players. They conclude that FHGs are “an appropriate way of modeling mergers
and splits of political jurisdictions” and that they “might also be used to model the formation of
students into schools or classes, workers into unions, or public employees into different pension
funds”.
3 PRELIMINARIES
Let N be a set {1, . . . ,n} of agents or players. A coalition is a subset of the players. For every
player i ∈ N , we let Ni denote the set {S ⊆ N : i ∈ S} of coalitions i is a member of. Every
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player i is equipped with a reflexive, complete, and transitive preference relation ≿i over the set
Ni . We use ≻i and ∼i to refer to the strict and indifferent parts of ≿i , respectively. If ≿i is also
anti-symmetric we say that i’s preferences are strict. A coalition S ∈ Ni is acceptable for a player i
if i weakly prefers S to being alone, that is, S ≿i {i}, and unacceptable otherwise. A hedonic game
is a pair (N ,≿), where ≿ = (≿1, . . . ,≿n) is a profile of preference relations ≿i , modeling the
preferences of the players.
A valuation function of a player i is a function vi : N → R assigning a real value to every player.
A hedonic game (N ,≿) is said to be a fractional hedonic game (FHG) if, for every player i in N ,
there is a valuation function vi such that for all coalitions S,T ∈ Ni ,
S ≿i T if and only if vi (S) ≥ vi (T ),
where, for all S ∈ Ni ,
vi (S) =
∑
j ∈S vi (j)
|S | .
Hence, every FHG can be compactly represented by a tuple of valuation functions v = (v1, . . . ,vn).
It can be shown that every FHG can be induced by valuation functions with vi (i) = 0 for all i ∈ N .4
Thus, we assume vi (i) = 0 throughout the paper. We will frequently associate FHGs with weighted
digraphs G = (N ,N × N ,v) where the weight of the edge (i, j) is vi (j), that is, the valuation of
player i for player j.
Two key restriction on the valuations in an FHG will be of particular interest to us.
• An FHG is symmetric if vi (j) = vj (i) for all i, j ∈ N .
• An FHG is simple if vi (j) ∈ {0, 1} for all i, j ∈ N .
Simple FHGs have a natural appeal. Politicians may want to be in a party which maximizes the
fraction of like-minded members and, for whatever reasons, people may want to be with as large a
fraction of people of the same ethnic or social group. These situations can be fruitfully modeled
and understood as a simple FHG by having the players assign value 1 to like-minded or ethnically
similar people, and 0 to others.
A simple FHG (N ,≿i ) can be represented by a digraph (V ,A) in which V = N and (i, j) ∈ A if
and only if vi (j) = 1. Similarly, if (N ,≿i ) is both symmetric and simple, it can be represented by an
(undirected) graph (V ,E) such that V = N and {i, j} ∈ E if and only if vi (j) = vj (i) = 1. With this
representation, we will often think of graphs and simple symmetric FHGs as the same thing.
The outcomes of hedonic games are partitions of the players, also known as coalition structures.
Given a partition π = {S1, . . . , Sm} of the players, π (i) denotes the coalition in π of which player i
is a member. We also write vi (π ) for vi (π (i)), which is the utility that i receives in π , reflecting the
hedonic nature of the games we consider. By the same token we obtain preferences over partitions
from preferences over coalitions. We refer to {N } as the grand coalition.
Hedonic games are analyzed using solution concepts, which formalize desirable or optimal ways
in which the players can be partitioned (as based on the players’ preferences over the coalitions). If
a partition satisfies a given solution concept, it is considered to be stable in the sense of the solution
concept. A basic requirement for partitions to be acceptable for all players is individual rationality.
A partition π is individually rational if each player weakly prefers his coalition in π over being
alone, that is, for each i ∈ N , π (i) ≿i {i}. Intuitively, if a partition is not individually rational, it
cannot be stable, since one player has an incentive to leave his current coalition and be on his own
instead. In this paper, we will focus on two of the most prominent solution concepts, the core and
4Let v ′i (j) = vi (j) − vi (i) for all i, j ∈ N . Then, v ′i (i) = 0, for all i ∈ N and S ⊆ N , vi (S ) =
∑
j∈S
vi (j )
|S | =∑
j∈S
v ′i (j )+vi (i )
|S | =
∑
j∈S
v ′i (i )
|S | + vi (i). Thus, for all S, T ⊆ N , vi (S ) ≥ vi (T ) if and only if v ′i (S ) ≥ v ′i (T ).
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Fig. 1. Example of a simple and symmetric FHG. The only core stable partition is {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}}. In
contrast, if the graph represents an additively separable hedonic game, then the partition consisting of the
grand coalition is the only core stable partition.
the strict core, taken from cooperative game theory. We say that a coalition S ⊆ N (strongly) blocks
a partition π , if each player i ∈ S strictly prefers S to his current coalition π (i) in the partition π ,
that is, if S ≻i π (i) for all i ∈ S . A partition that does not admit a blocking coalition is said to be in
the core. In a similar vein, we say that a coalition S ⊆ N weakly blocks a partition π , if each player
i ∈ S weakly prefers S to π (i) and there exists at least one player j ∈ S who strictly prefers S to
his current coalition π (j), that is, S ≿i π (i) for all i ∈ N and S ≻j π (j) for some j ∈ S . A partition
does not admit a weakly blocking coalition is in the strict core. Cleary, the strict core is a subset of
the core. Moreover, the core is a subset of the set of individually rational coalitions, since every
coalition that is not individually rational is blocked by a singleton coalition.
Example 3.1. Consider the simple and symmetric FHG based on the graph depicted in Figure 1.
In the grand coalition, the utility of each player is 12 . There is only one core stable partition:
{{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}}, which yields utility 23 for each player. Observe that, when interpreted as an
additively separable hedonic game, this is not a stable partition, as the grand coalition would yield
a higher utility—namely, 3 instead of 2—to all and thus be a blocking coalition.
Some standard graph-theoretic terminology will be useful. The complete undirected graph on n
vertices is denoted by Kn ; an undirected cycle on n vertices is denoted byCn . A graph (V ,E) is said
to be k-partite if V can be partitioned into k independent sets V1, . . . ,Vk , that is, v,w ∈ Vi implies
{v,w} < E. A k-partite graph is complete if for all v ∈ Vi andw ∈ Vj we have {v,w} ∈ E if and only
if i , j.
4 NEGATIVE RESULTS
For any game-theoretic solution concept, two natural questions are whether a solution is always
guaranteed to exist, and whether a solution can be found efficiently. For the core of FHGs, the
answer to both of these questions turns out to be negative if we do not restrict the structure of the
underlying graph.
For unrestricted FHGs (that is, if we allow any weighted digraph), it is easy to construct examples
whose core is empty (see Figure 2a). Even if we require the game to be symmetric, it is not difficult
to find examples with empty core (see Figure 2b). Of course, the examples given are specifically
constructed so as to not admit a core stable outcome, and it is plausible that “most” FHGs do admit
one. Indeed, Weese et al. [2017] randomly sampled 10 million symmetric FHGs similar to the one
shown in Figure 2b, and all of them had a non-empty core.
If we consider the strict core, it is also easy to construct an example of a simple symmetric FHG
whose strict core is empty: consider the FHG represented by a cycle of size five (C5). For C5, any
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(a) An FHGgiven by aweighted digraphwhose
core is empty. All missing edges have weight
−10.
1
2
3
4
5
6
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5
6
7
5
6
7
5
6
(b) A symmetric FHG given by weighted graph
whose core is empty. All missing edges have
weight −24.
Fig. 2. Examples of (symmetric) FHGs with empty core.
Fig. 3. A simple symmetric FHG with 40 players whose core is empty (see Theorem 4.1). An edge between
two encircled cliques indicates that every vertex of one clique is connected to every vertex of the other.
coalition of size three or more admits a blocking coalition of size two, and partitions consisting of
one singleton and two coalitions of size two also admit a weakly blocking coalition.
It was open for some time whether there is a simple symmetric FHG whose core is empty. Here,
we present such an example, consisting of a total of 40 players, see Figure 3. It is unclear whether
smaller examples exist. Note that this result subsumes all of the non-existence results mentioned
above.
Theorem 4.1. In simple and symmetric FHGs, the core can be empty.
The proofs of this and other results can be found in the appendix.
Now that we have seen that the core of an FHG can be empty, we can move on to some
computational questions. The natural problem to consider is to find a core stable partition. Since such
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an partition does not always exist, we can conveniently consider the decision problem of whether
the core of a given FHG is non-empty. It turns out that, without imposing further restrictions,
answering this question is computationally difficult, and in particular NP-hard. The examples with
empty core that we have seen make for convenient gadgets in hardness reductions.
Notice that the problem of checking whether an FHG has non-empty core is not obviously
contained in the class NP: the natural certificate would be a core stable partition, but it is not at all
clear how to check whether a given partition is in the core; naively, this would require checking all
2n possible blocking coalitions. In fact, this problem of verifying whether a partition is in the core
is already coNP-complete (we sketch a proof in the appendix, an alternative proof appears in Liu
and Wei, 2017). The natural complexity class for the non-emptiness problem is Σp2 = NP
NP which
captures the alternation of quantifiers: “does there exist a partition π such that for all coalitions S ,
the coalition does not block?”. Indeed, we can show that the non-emptiness problem is complete
for this class, even for simple and symmetric FHGs.
Theorem 4.2. Checking whether a simple symmetric FHG has an empty core is Σp2 -complete.
The proof of this statement is a rather involved reduction from the MAX-MIN CLIQUE problem
[Ko and Lin, 1995], and uses a notion of ‘subsidies’ to players who are put in singleton coalitions.
FHGs are not the only class of hedonic games for which checking non-emptiness of the core is
Σ
p
2 -complete: additively separable and Boolean hedonic games are other examples [Peters, 2015,
Woeginger, 2013].
As Woeginger [2013] argues, the fact that finding a core stable outcome is Σp2 -hard means that
this solution concept is computationally much harder to handle than solution concepts like Nash
stability, where the analogous decision problem is contained in NP. Indeed, recent advances in SAT
and ILP solvers mean that many NP-complete problems of moderate size are now easily solvable in
practice; this is not the case for Σp2 -complete problems.
However, Weese et al. [2017] present a heuristic algorithm that attempts to find a core stable
partition by repeatedly searching for a blocking coalition using an ILP solver and implementing
this deviation. They find that this approach is reasonably efficient for real-world examples with up
to 1,000 players.
5 POSITIVE RESULTS
In this section, we present a number of subclasses of simple and symmetric FHGs for which the
core is non-empty. Since these games can be represented by unweighted and undirected graphs,
we will focus on different graph classes. In particular we show existence results for the following
classes of graphs: graphs with degree at most two, forests, multi-partite complete graphs, bipartite
graphs which admit perfect matchings, regular bipartite graphs, and graphs with girth at least
five. All of our proofs are constructive in the sense that we show that the core is non-empty by
outlining a way to construct a partition in the core; in each case this construction can be performed
in polynomial time.
5.1 Graphs with bounded degree
If a graph is extremely sparse, then intuitively it does not admit interesting blocking coalitions.
Indeed, we have the following result.
Theorem 5.1. For simple and symmetric FHGs represented by graphs of degree at most 2, the core
is non-empty.
The proof employs a simple greedy algorithm partitioning the players into coalitions of size
at most 3. Such a strategy is successful in this case since the connected components of graphs of
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degree at most 2 are paths and cycles, and in this situation, players are relatively happy in a small
coalition together with an immediate neighbor.
Theorem 4.1 shows that the positive result for the degree bound of 2 cannot be extended to a
bound of 11 (which is the maximum degree of the example given there). It might be interesting to
close this gap; but the case of degree 3 already seems difficult.
5.2 Forests
The example of an FHG with empty core that we gave above depended crucially on an underlying
cyclic structure of the game. If we do not allow such cycles, the problem disappears:
Theorem 5.2. For simple and symmetric FHGs represented by undirected forests, the core is non-
empty.
The proof employs a simple dynamic programming algorithm, which essentially exploits that
the preferences of a vertex are somewhat opposed to the preferences of its grandparent, so that
blocking coalitions would need to be very ‘local’. The algorithm matches generations into pairs
and produces a partition in which vertices are locally satisfied, making it stable.
The conclusion of Theorem 5.2 could be reached in an alternative way. Notice that the coalitions
in any partition in the core of a simple and symmetric FHG need to be connected in the underlying
graph: otherwise, a proper connected component would block. Thus, an FHG given by a graph
G can be viewed as a hedonic game with graph structure with communication structure given
by G in the sense of Igarashi and Elkind [2016]. They showed that, by a result due to Demange
[2004], the core of such games is non-empty if G is a forest. However, this method does not yield a
polynomial-time algorithm to produce an element of the core.
5.3 Bakers and Millers: complete k-partite graphs
In the introduction we referred to the Bakers and Millers setting, in which the players are of two
different types and each of them prefers the fraction of players of the other type to be as high as
possible. The setting could arise if individuals of the same type are competitors engaging in trade
with individuals of the other type.
This idea can easily be extended to multiple types. Let Θ = {θ1, . . . ,θk } be a set of types that
partitions the set N of players, where k = |Θ|. Let θ (i) denote the type of player i . A hedonic game
(N ,≿) is called a Bakers and Millers game if the preferences of each player i are such that for all
coalitions S,T ∈ Ni ,
S ≿i T if and only if
|S ∩ θ (i)|
|S | ≤
|T ∩ θ (i)|
|T | .
Thus, a player prefers coalitions in which a larger fraction of players are of a different type. With
this formalization, we see that a Bakers and Millers game with k types is a simple and symmetric
FHG represented by a complete k-partite graph with the maximal independent sets representing the
types, that is, a graph (V ,E) with V = N and
E = {{i, j} : θ (i) , θ (j)}.
In this setting, the grand coalition is always in the strict core: Since the types partition the player
set, observe that for every coalition S we have
|S ∩ θ1 |
|S | + · · · +
|S ∩ θt |
|S | = 1.
Now assume for a contradiction that the grand coalition N is not in the strict core. Then there is a
(weakly blocking) coalition S such that |S∩θ (i) ||S | <
|N∩θ (i) |
|N | for some i ∈ S and |S∩θ (j) ||S | ≤ |N∩θ (j) ||N | for
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all j ∈ S . But then
|S ∩ θ1 |
|S | + · · · +
|S ∩ θt |
|S | <
|N ∩ θ1 |
|N | + · · · +
|N ∩ θt |
|N | ,
that is, 1 < 1, a contradiction. Generalizing this idea we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3. Let (N ,≿) be a Bakers and Millers game with type space Θ = {θ1, . . . ,θt } and π =
{S1, . . . , Sm} a partition. Then, π is in the strict core if and only if for all types θ ∈ Θ and all
coalitions S, S ′ ∈ π ,
|S ∩ θ |
|S | =
|S ′ ∩ θ |
|S ′ | .
Let d denote the greatest common divisor of |θ1 |, . . . , |θt |, which we know can be computed in
time linear in t [cf. Bradley, 1970]. Theorem 5.3 can now be rephrased as follows: a partition π for a
Bakers and Millers game is in the strict core if and only if for all coalitions S in π there is a positive
integer kS such that for all types θi we have |S ∩ θi | = kS |θi |/d . Thus, for the grand coalition N we
have kN = d . There is also a partition π such that kS = 1 for all coalitions S in π which is in the
strict core; no finer partition is in the strict core. We say that two partitions π and π ′ are identical
up to renaming players of the same type if there is a bijection f : N → N such that for all players i
we have θ (i) = θ (f (i)) and π ′ = {{ f (i) : i ∈ S} : S ∈ π }. Hence, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 5.4. For every Bakers and Millers game, there is a unique finest partition in the strict
core (up to renaming players of the same type), which, moreover, can be computed in linear time.
As the strict core is a subset of the core, the “if”-direction of Theorem 5.3 also holds for the core:
every partition π such that |S∩θ ||S | =
|S ′∩θ |
|S ′ | for all types θ ∈ Θ and all coalitions S, S ′ ∈ π is in the
core. The inverse of this statement, however, does not generally hold: Consider three players 1, 2,
and 3, with 1 belonging to type θ1, while 2 and 3 belong to type θ2. Then, the coalition structure
{{1, 2}, {3}} is in the core but not in the strict core: the coalition {1, 3} would be weakly blocking.
5.4 Graphs with large girth
The girth of a graph is the length of the shortest cycle in the graph. For example, bipartite graphs
have a girth of at least four. Graphs with a girth of at least five do not admit triangles or cycles of
length four. FHGs described by such graphs always admit a core partition. The key idea behind this
result is to pack the vertices of the graph representing a fractional game into stars while maximizing
a particular objective function (namely, maximizing the leximin objective). The resulting partition
is in the core.
Theorem 5.5. For simple and symmetric FHGs represented by graphs with girth at least five, the
core is non-empty, and there always exists a partition into stars that is in the core.
The argument establishing this, while constructive, does not directly yield a polynomial-time
algorithm finding an element of the core, since it is not clear whether a star packing optimizing our
leximin objective function can be found polynomial time. In the appendix, we show that certain
local maxima are also core stable, and that they can be found in polynomial time through local
search.
It is worth observing that, even if a core partition consisting of stars exists, there may still be
other stable partitions. Consider, for example, a game given by a star with 3 leaves on the vertex
set {c, ℓ1, ℓ2, ℓ3}. Then the partition π = {{c, ℓ1, ℓ2}, {ℓ3}} is in the core, but it is not a star packing.
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Fig. 4. The complete bipartite graph K4,10 in which no star packing yields a stable partition. For instance, the
partition indicated by the solid edges is not stable as {a,b, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8} would deviate.
5.5 Bipartite graphs
For FHGs on bipartite graphs (whose girth is always at least 4), it is not always the case that there
are star-packings that also yield partitions in the core: it can be checked that no partition into stars
of the FHG given by the complete bipartite graph K4,10 with 14 vertices is in its core; see Figure 4.
On the other hand, since K4,10 is a Bakers and Millers game, by Theorem 5.3, the grand coalition is
in the core, which thus is non-empty. This example shows that any method of finding partitions in
the core in games on bipartite graphs based on finding star-packings is bound to fail.
We have not been able to prove whether the core is non-empty for all bipartite graphs, and this
remains an interesting open problem. For certain subclasses of bipartite graphs, positive results can
still be obtained. For example, we can observe that perfect matchings, if they exist, are in the core.
Lemma 5.6. For every FHG that is represented by an undirected bipartite graph admitting a perfect
matching the core is non-empty.
Proof. Let {N ′,N ′′} be the respective bipartition of N . For every coalition S ⊆ N , either
|N ′∩S |
|S | ≤ 12 or |N
′′∩S |
|S | ≤ 12 . Hence, every coalition S contains at least one player i with vi (S) ≤ 12 .
In a perfect matching, considered as a partition, every player has value 12 . Hence, every perfect
matching is in the core and the claim follows. □
We can then obtain the following result as a corollary of Hall’s Theorem.
Corollary 5.7. For all bipartite k-regular graphs the core of the corresponding FHG is non-empty.
It would be desirable to find additional examples of classes of bipartite graphs for which a
non-empty core is guaranteed.
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Fig. 5. A social symmetric FHG in which no core stable partition exists. The weight of an edge {i, j} denotes
vi (j). All missing edges have weight 0.
A PROOFS
A.1 Empty core
To prove Theorem 4.1, we give a simple and symmetric FHG that does not admit a core stable
partition. Since this game is fairly large (40 players), we first illustrate the construction by giving
a simpler example (15 players) from a slightly larger class of games. To this end, we say that an
FHG is social if vi (j) ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ N . Clearly, every simple FHG is also social. The FHG depicted
in Figure 5 is social and symmetric, but has an empty core. We omit the proof, since Theorem 4.1
proves a stronger statement.
The simple and symmetric FHG with empty core depicted in Figure 6 is derived from the game
given in Figure 5 by replacing all players ai and ci by a clique of 3 players and all players bi by a
clique of 2 players. These cliques are denoted by Ai , Ci , and Bi , respectively. Then, the number of
players a player is connected to in the union of two connected cliques in Figure 6 is equal to the
weight of the edge between the corresponding players in Figure 5.
Theorem A.1. In simple and symmetric FHGs, the core can be empty.
Proof. The core of the FHG depicted in Figure 6 is empty. For two players i, j ∈ N we say that i
is connected to j if i’s valuation for j is 1 (and vice versa). Let π be in the core. The first step is to
show that Al ⊆ S ∈ π and Cl ⊆ T ∈ π for all l ∈ {1, . . . , 5}. We show both statements for l = 1.
The rest follows from the symmetry of the game.
A1 ⊆ S ∈ π : Assume for contradiction that this is not the case. Since A1 ∪C1 is a 6-clique, at
least one player i ∈ A1 ∪C1 has a valuations of at least 5/6 for his coalition (otherwise A1 ∪C1 is
blocking). Assume i ∈ A1. If π (i) contains a player that i is not connected to, then ui (π ) ≤ 9/11 < 5/6
since i is connected to at most 9 players in any coalition. Hence π (i) only contains players i is
connected to. But then A1 ∪ π (i) is blocking, since every player in A1 is connected to the same
players as i , a contradiction. Hence i ∈ C1. A1 ∩ π (i) = ∅ implies ui (π ) ≤ 4/5. If π (i) contains a
player that i is not connected to, then ui (π ) ≤ 7/9 < 5/6, since i is connected to at most 7 players
in any coalition. Hence, π (i) ∩A1 = S , ∅ and π (i) only contains players i is connected to. Thus,
C1 ⊆ π (i) (otherwise C1 ∪ π (i) is blocking).
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At least one player k1 in A1 ∪ B1 and at least one player k2 in A1 ∪ B5 has a valuation of at
least 4/5 for his coalition, since both sets are 5-cliques. k1,k2 < S , since uj (π ) ≤ 4/6 for all j ∈ S . If
k1 ∈ A1 \ S , then π (k1) only contains players that k1 is connected to, otherwise uk1 (π ) ≤ 5/7 < 4/5.
Then π (k1) ∪ S is blocking. Hence k1 ∈ B1. Analogously, it follows that k2 ∈ B5. We show that
π (k1) , π (k2). Assume for contradiction that π (k1) = π (k2) = T . If S contains at least two players
that k1 is not connected to, we have uk1 (T ) ≤ 10/13 < 4/5 (since k1 is connected to at most 10 players
in any coalition). Hence, T contains one player k1 is not connected to, namely k2. The analogous
assertion holds for k2. Since uk2 (T ) ≥ 4/5, we have |T | ≥ 10. But then T contains at least 2 players
k1 is not connected to, since there are only 3 players that both k1 and k2 are connected to. This
implies that uk1 (T ) ≤ 10/13 < 4/5, a contradiction.
If B4 ⊆ π (i), it follows that uj (π ) ≤ 4/7 < 2/3 for all j ∈ S . If j ∈ A1 \ S is in a coalition with a
player that j is not connected to, uj (π ) ≤ 3/5 < 2/3, since π (j) cannot contain a player from π (i) and
from both π (k1) and π (k2) (since π (k1) , π (k2)). Hence S ∪ π (j) is blocking.
If |π (i) ∩ B4 | = 1 it follows that |S | = 2 and uj (π ) = 4/6 for all j ∈ S . At least one player k in
A5 ∪ B4 has a valuation of at least 4/5 for his coalition. If k ∈ π (i) it follows that uk (π ) = 3/6 < 4/5, a
contradiction. If k ∈ B4 \ π (i), then π (k) only contains players that k is connected to. If A4 ⊆ π (k)
orA5 ⊆ π (k), thenA4∪C4 andA5∪C5 are blocking, respectively. |π (k)∩A4 | = 2 or |π (k)∩A5 | = 2
is not possible since our previous analysis for A1 and C1 also applies to A4 and C4, and A5 and C5,
respectively. But then, uk (π ) ≤ 2/3 < 4/5. Hence k ∈ A5. This implies that π (k) only contains players
that k is connected to. Hence A5 ⊆ π (k), otherwise A5 ∪ π (k) is blocking. Also π (k) , A5 ∪ B5,
because otherwise A5 ∪C5 is blocking. Hence A5 ∩ π (k2) = ∅. Thus, π (k2) can only contain players
k2 is connected to. This implies B5 ⊆ π (k2). Asuk2 (π ) ≥ 4/5, |π (k2)∩C2 | ≥ 2. Thus, if π (k1) contains
some player in A2, then A2 ∪ C2 is blocking. If π (k2) = B5 ∪ C2, then A2 ∪ C2 is blocking and
otherwise C2 is blocking. This contradicts that π is stable.
C1 ⊆ T ∈ π : At least one player i in B4 ∪ C1 has a valuation of at least 4/5 for his coalition
(otherwise B4 ∪C1 is blocking). Assume i ∈ B4 and uj (π ) < 4/5 for all j ∈ C1. Then Al ⊆ π (i) for
some l ∈ {4, 5}. But then Al ∪Cl is blocking. Hence the assumption is wrong and i ∈ C1. Note that
π (i) cannot contain a player i is not connected to, otherwise ui (π ) ≤ 7/9 < 4/5, since i is connected
to at most 7 players in any coalition. But then C1 ⊆ π (i), otherwise C1 ∪ π (i) is blocking.
It cannot be that π (i) ⊆ Al ∪ Bl or π (i) ⊆ Al ∪ Bl−1 for i ∈ Al , since Al ∪Cl is blocking for all
l ∈ {1, . . . , 5}.
IfA1∪C1∪S ∈ π with ∅ , S ⊆ B4, thenui (π ) ≤ 5/7 < 4/5 for all i ∈ A1. Hence B1∪C3,B5∪C2 ∈ π ,
otherwise either A1 ∪ B1 or A1 ∪ B5 are blocking (ui (A1 ∪ B1) = ui (A1 ∪ B5) = 4/5 for all i ∈ A1).
But then ui (π ) ≤ 4/5 for all i ∈ A2. Hence A2 ∪ C2 is blocking, a contradiction. In any other
partition in which some i ∈ A1 is in a coalition with a player that he is not connected to, we have
ui (π ) ≤ 9/11 < 5/6 for all i ∈ A1 and uj (π ) ≤ 4/5 < 5/6 for all j ∈ C1. HenceA1 ∪C1 is blocking. Hence
π (i) only contains players i is connected to for all i ∈ Al and l ∈ {1, . . . , 5}.
We have shown previously that at least one player il ∈ Cl has a valuation of at least 4/5 for his
coalition for all l ∈ {1, . . . , 5}. Hence, π (il ) cannot contain a player that il is not connected to.
Therefore, either π (il ) = Al ∪Cl or π (il ) = Bl−2 ∪Cl for all l ∈ {1, . . . , 5}. If Al ∪Cl ∈ π for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, then A1 ∪ B1 ∪ B5 is blocking. Hence we can assume without loss of generality that
A1 ∪ S ∈ π with S ⊆ B1 ∪ B5. If |S | < 3, then A1 ∪C1 is blocking. Hence |S | ≥ 3. Without loss of
generality, B5 ⊆ S . It follows that B4 ∪C1 ∈ π , since one player in C1 has a valuation of at least
4/5 for his coalition. This implies that A4 ∪C4 ∈ π . Furthermore A2 ∪C2,A3 ∪C3 ∈ π , otherwise
B5 ∪C2 and B1 ∪C3 are blocking, respectively. Then we get A5 ∪C5 ∈ π . But then A3 ∪ B2 ∪ B3 is
blocking. Hence, π is not in the core, a contradiction.
□
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Fig. 6. A simple and symmetric FHG with empty core. For all l ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, Al and Cl denote cliques of 3
players and Bl denotes a clique of 2 players. An edge from one clique to another denotes that every player in
the first clique is connected to every player in the second clique. All depicted edges have weight 1. All missing
edges have weight 0.
Remark A.2. Suppose we delete one of the players from B2 in the game above, so that now |B2 | = 1.
The resulting game admits a partition π in its core: π = {A1 ∪B1 ∪B5,A2 ∪C2,A3 ∪C3,A4 ∪C4,A5 ∪
C5,B4 ∪C1,B2,B3}. That π is in the core can be checked by hand or by computer.
A.2 Hardness results
We will now show that it is computationally hard to decide whether a given FHG admits a non-
empty core. This problem turns out to be Σp2 -complete, and thus complete for the second level of
the polynomial hierarchy, even for simple and symmetric FHGs. Our argument is rather involved;
shorter proofs exist when aiming only for NP-hardness and without the restriction to simple and
symmetric games [Brandl et al., 2015, Peters and Elkind, 2015].
We will start our reduction from the problem MAXMIN-CLIQUE, which is Πp2 -complete [Ko and
Lin, 1995]:
MINMAX-CLIQUE
Instance: An undirected graph H = (V ,E) whose vertex set V = ⋃ni=1⋃cj=1Vi, j is
partitioned into a grid with n rows and c columns, and a target integer k .
Question: Is it the case that for every way of choosing exactly one Vi, j for each
row i , the union of the n chosen cells contains clique of size k?
From the reduction presented by Ko and Lin [1995], it follows that this problem remains Πp2 -
complete even if c = 2, all theVi, j ’s contain the same number of vertices (say |Vi, j | =m), and k = n.
From this, it is easy to see that the problem with k = n + nm2 is also hard: just add a clique of
2nm (= |V |) new vertices to H , connect each of the new vertices to every of the old vertices, and
distribute the new vertices into the grid so that eachVi, j contains preciselym of these new vertices.
Note that after this reduction, the value ofm has doubled.
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Taking the complement of the problem we have now arrived at, we find that the following
problem is Σp2 -complete. (Note the change from “minmax” to “maxmin”.)
MAXMIN-CLIQUE
Instance: An undirected graph H = (V ,E) whose vertex set V = ⋃ni=1⋃j=1,2Vi, j
is partitioned into a grid with n rows and 2 columns, where all cells contain the
same number of vertices, say |Vi, j | =m for all i, j.
Question: Is there a way to choose exactly one of Vi,1 and Vi,2 for each row i so
that the union of the n chosen cells does not contain a clique of size n + nm2 ?
We will not give a direct reduction from MAXMIN-CLIQUE to our problem about FHGs, but
will instead consider an intermediate problem first. Later, we show how to extend this to the case
we are actually interested in. Our intermediate problem uses a modification of allowing so-called
supported players, who are unusually happy in a singleton coalition. A similar device also appears
in the Σp2 -hardness proof by [Peters, 2015] for additively separable hedonic games. The formal
definition of our problem is as follows.
Core-non-emptiness with Supported Players
Instance: An undirected unweighted graph G = (N ,E), defining an FHG. This
hedonic game is then modified by identifying a number of supported players S ⊆ N
who receive a specified subsidy when they are alone, i.e., for each i ∈ S , we set
v({i}) = (li − 1)/li for some given integer li ≥ 4 (encoded in unary).
Question: Does the given hedonic game admit a non-empty core?
Later we will show a reduction from this problem to the case without supported players; there
the technical assumption that the subsidies satisfy li ≥ 4 will become useful.
Theorem A.3. Core-non-emptiness with Supported Players is Σp2 -complete.
Proof. We reduce from MAXMIN-CLIQUE. So let H = (V ,E) be a given graph with vertex
partition V =
⋃n
i=1
⋃
j=1,2Vi, j with |Vi, j | =m for all i and j and with target clique size k = n + nm2 .
We now construct a game G = (N ,E ′) with supported players S .
LetM be a big number,M = 20m2n will do.
We produce the following players.
• For each row i , we introduce a player zi who will eventually be responsible for choosing
one of the cells Vi,1 or Vi,2.
• For each of the two cells Vi,1 and Vi,2 of a row, we introduce a set ofM supported players;
|Xi,1 | = |Xi,2 | = M . Each of these players receive subsidy (M + 2m)/(M + 2m + 1).
• Each original vertex v ∈ V is also a player v ∈ N .
• For each original vertex v ∈ V , we introduce a mate v ′.
• For each v ∈ V , we also introduce a set Cv of k − 3 supported players with subsidy
(k − 2)/(k − 1).
• For each player zi , we introduce a set Ozi of 39 players who will form a copy of the game
from Theorem 4.1 with empty core.
• For each mate player v ′, we introduce a set Ov ′ of 39 players who will form a copy of the
game from Theorem 4.1 with empty core.
IfW ⊆ V is a subset of vertices, let’s writeW ′ = {v ′ : v ∈ W } for the collection of mates of
vertices inW . Summarizing, we have produced the following set of players:
N = V ∪V ′ ∪ {zi : i ∈ [n]} ∪
⋃
i, j ∈[n]×[2]
Xi, j ∪
⋃
v ∈V
Cv ∪
⋃
v ′∈V ′
Ov ′ ∪
⋃
i ∈[n]
Ozi ,
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of which the following are supported:
S =
⋃
i, j ∈[n]×[2]
Xi, j ∪
⋃
v ∈V
Cv .
We also need to construct the set of edges E ′:
• All original edges from E are in E ′.
• For each v , the set Cv ∪ {v,v ′} forms a clique of size k − 1.
• For each cell Vi, j , the set Xi, j ∪ {zi } forms a clique of sizeM + 1.
• For each v ∈ Vi, j , both v and v ′ are connected to all vertices in Xi, j .
• The sets Ozi ∪ {zi } and Ov ′i ∪ {v ′i } form a copy of the game from Theorem 4.1, such that
the distinguished player (zi and vi respectively) is one of the two players in B2.
• There are no other edges.
This completes the description of the reduction.
=⇒ : Suppose the game G admits a core-stable partition π . We show how to choose cells
t : [n] → {1, 2} so that⋃i Vi,t (i) contains no clique of size k .
Note first that every coalition in π needs to be connected in G, since otherwise a connected
component blocks π . Consider some row i ∈ [n]. Since the game restricted to the players in
Ozi ∪ {zi } does not possess a core-stable partition, and by connectedness, the player zi needs to
be together with one of his neighbors outside Ozi , i.e., with a neighbor from Xi,1 ∪ Xi,2. Say this
neighbor x comes fromXi,1, so x ∈ π (zi )∩Xi,1. We show that in fact π (zi ) = {zi }∪Xi,1∪V ′i,1∪Vi,1.
• ⊇: We know that x ∈ π (zi ). Now x is supported with subsidy (M + 2m)/(M + 2m + 1); since
{x} does not block π , it must be the case that x ’s utility in π is at least as high as its subsidy.
Hence |π (zi )| = |π (x)| ≥ M + 2m + 1, and x must have at leastM + 2m neighbors in π (zi ).
Recalling thatm = |Vi, j | for all i and j , and looking at the reduction, we see that x only has
M + 2m neighbors in total, namelyVi,1 ∪V ′i,1 ∪ {zi } ∪Xi,1 \ {x}, and hence this must form
a subset of π (zi ).
• ⊆: If there are any additional players in π (zi ), then x obtains utility strictly less than
(M + 2m − 1)/(M + 2m), and then {x} would block π , invoking his subsidy.
We deduce that for each row i , either π (zi ) = {zi }∪Xi,1∪V ′i,1∪Vi,1 or π (zi ) = {zi }∪Xi,2∪V ′i,2∪Vi,2.
This allows us to choose cell Vi,2 in the former case (setting t(i) = 2) and Vi,1 in the latter (setting
t(i) = 1). Note that zi is together with the cell that is not chosen.
Now let’s consider the players in Xi,t (i) corresponding to a chosen cell. Given what we know
so far about π , these players only haveM + 2m − 1 remaining neighbors (since zi is in a different
coalition). Thus, no non-singleton coalition can give such a player utility exceeding the subsidy
(M + 2m)/(M + 2m + 1). Hence each player in Xi,t (i) is in a singleton in π .
Now consider a vertexv ∈ Vi,t (i) in a chosen cell and look at its matev ′. Since the game restricted
to the players in Ov ′ ∪ {v ′} does not possess a core-stable partition, the player v ′ needs to be
together with a neighbor outsideOv ′ , i.e., needs to be together with v and/or a player inCv . In fact,
we can see that v ′ needs to be together with at least one player from Cv : if not, then v ′ obtains
utility at most 11/12 (because v ′ has 10 neighbors in Ov ′ plus the neighbor v), and then Cv ∪ {v ′}
is blocking. Thus we have shown that there is c ∈ Cv with c ∈ π (v ′). Since {c} is not blocking, c’s
utility in π must exceed its subsidy (k − 2)/(k − 1). Thus |π (v ′)| = |π (c)| ≥ k − 1 and c needs to
have at least k − 2 neighbors in π (v ′). But c has exactly k − 2 neighbors, and so, like above, we have
π (v ′) = {v,v ′} ∪Cv . In particular, each v ∈ Vi,t (i) in a chosen cell obtains utility (k − 2)/(k − 1).
Finally, suppose for a contradiction that the union
⋃
i Vi,t (i) of the chosen cells contains a
clique K ⊆ V of size k . Then each vertex of K obtains utility (k − 1)/k in K , so K blocks π , a
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contradiction. Hence, with our choice of t : [n] → {1, 2}, the set⋃i Vi,t (i) contains no clique of sizek .
⇐= : Suppose there is a way of choosing t : [n] → {1, 2} so that⋃i Vi,t (i) contains no clique of
size k . We construct a partition π of N which is core-stable. For each row i ∈ [n]:
• {x} ∈ π for each x ∈ Xi,t (i).
• {v,v ′} ∪Cv ∈ π for each v ∈ Vi,t (i).
• {zi } ∪ Xi,¬t (i) ∪V ′i,¬t (i) ∪Vi,¬t (i) ∈ π , where ¬t(i) = 3 − t(i) is the not-chosen index.
• {c} ∈ π for each c ∈ Cv for v ∈ Vi,¬t (i).
• The players in sets Oz′ and Ov ′ are partitioned in the way indicated in Remark A.2.
Let us note first that each player zi receives utilityM/(M + 2m + 1) > 11/12, and also each mate
v ′ either receives utility (k − 2)/(k − 1) > 11/12 or (1+M)/(M + 2m + 1) > 11/12 sinceM is chosen
large enough. Because zi and v ′ players only have 10 neighbors in Ozi and Ov ′ , respectively, they
will not block in a coalition that is contained entirely withinOzi ∪ {zi } orOvi ∪ {vi }, because those
only bring utility at most 10/11.
We now show that π admits no blocking coalitions. To do so, we will go through all the players
to check that they have no incentive to deviate. (We will say that a player i is not blocking if i is not
part of any blocking coalition.) First notice that π is individually rational, and in particular every
supported player receives at least its subsidy. Therefore no singleton coalition blocks π .
• The players x ∈ Xi,¬t (i) are in a best-possible coalitions: they are together with exactly
their neighbors. Hence they will never be part of a blocking coalition.
• The players x ∈ Xi,t (i) (who form singletons in π and currently receive their subsidy) will
not deviate, because the only coalition that exceeds their subsidy would be x ’s neighborhood
{zi } ∪Xi,t (i) ∪V ′i,t (i) ∪Vi,t (i), yet this is not a blocking coalition since zi is not better off in
it.
• For each zi , we have excluded all the neighbors x ∈ Xi, j of zi as possible members of a
blocking coalition. This would only leave a blocking coalition contained entirely within
Ozi ∪ {zi }, which is not an improvement for zi as argued above. Hence zi will not block.
• Each c ∈ Cv where v ∈ Vi,t (i) is in a best-possible coalition because its coalition is precisely
its neighborhood, and hence will not deviate.
• Each c ∈ Cv where v ∈ Vi,¬t (i) (who forms a singleton in π and currently receives its
subsidy) cannot block, because the only coalition that exceeds its subsidy would be its
neighborhood {v,v ′} ∪Cv , but this coalition is not blocking because v ′ is not better off
(since (1 +M)/(M + 2m + 1) > (k − 2)/(k − 1) by choice ofM large enough).
• Consider a mate player v ′. We have already shown that all of its neighbors, except possibly
v and from Ov ′ , are not part of blocking coalitions. But a blocking coalition contained in
{v,v ′} ∪Ov ′ brings utility at most 11/12 to v ′ (because v ′ only has 11 neighbors in this
set), and thus v ′ is not better off in such a coalition. Hence no mate player is blocking.
• No player in Ozi or Ov ′ can be part of a blocking coalition by Remark A.2, since zi and v ′,
respectively, are not blocking.
• Each v ∈ Vi,¬t (i) currently receives utility ≥ (1 +M)/(M + 2m + 1) which, for our choice
of M large enough, exceeds the utility v could receive in any coalition S ⊆ V consisting
entirely of original vertices (this quantity being at most (|V | − 1)/|V | = (2nm − 1)/2nm).
• Thus, any blocking coalition S that we have not yet excluded must consist entirely of
original vertices in chosen cells, that is S ⊆ ⋃ni=1Vi,t (i). Because each v ∈ S currently
obtains utility (k − 2)/(k − 1), S must give each member a utility exceeding this value. We
show that S is a clique in the graph H , and of size ≥ k , which gives a contradiction.
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Let r := |S |. Note that r ≤ mn = |⋃ni=1Vi,t (i) |. Suppose that S is not a clique. Then there
exists a vertex v ∈ S which is not connected to every otherw ∈ S . Thus
uv (S) ≤ r − 2
r
≤ mn − 2
mn
<
k − 2
k − 1 ,
where the last inequality follows from k > mn2 + 1 by simple algebra. But because S is
assumed to be blocking, we know that (k − 2)/(k − 1) < uv (S), and hence we have a
contradiction. Thus, S must be a clique. Since each v ∈ S obtains utility > (k − 2)/(k − 1) in
it, we must have that |S | ≥ k , a contradiction.
Thus, no blocking coalition exists, and hence π is in the core. □
With this result in place, we can now formally state the following problem, and prove it to be
hard:
Core-non-emptiness for simple and symmetric FHGs
Instance: An undirected unweighted graph G = (N ,E), defining an FHG.
Question: Does the given FHG game admit a non-empty core?
Theorem A.4. Core-non-emptiness for simple and symmetric FHGs is Σp2 -complete.
Proof. We reduce from Core-non-emptiness with Supported Players. So let G = (N ,E) be a
FHG modified by having supported players S ⊆ N where i ∈ S gets subsidy (li − 1)/li where li ≥ 4.
We build a new FHG H = (N ′,E ′) without supported players such thatG possesses a core-stable
partition if and only if H does.
The player set N ′ of H subsumes every original player from N , so N ⊆ N ′. In addition, for each
supported player i ∈ S , we add a setCi of (li − 1) new players. Together we have N ′ = N ∪⋃i ∈S Ci .
The edge set E ′ of H subsumes the original edges, so E ⊆ E ′. Also, the setsCi ∪ {i} form a clique
of li players for each i ∈ S . There are no other edges.
This completes the description of the reduction. Before we prove correctness, let us analyze
the preferences of players j ∈ Ci . Clearly, j’s unique most-preferred coalition is Ci ∪ {i}, which is
precisely j’s neighborhood. Ranked second are all coalitions of (li −2) neighbors of j together with j
(that is, the coalitionsCi andCi \ {k} ∪ {i} for some k ∈ Ci \ {j}) which give j utility (li − 2)/(li − 1).
All other coalitions are ranked lower than these: let C ∋ j be any other coalition.
• If |C | ≤ li − 2, then j obtains utility ≤ (li − 3)/(li − 2) < (li − 2)/(li − 1).
• If |C | = li − 1, then, becauseC is a coalition different from the ones considered above, j has
at most li − 3 neighbors in C , so obtains utility ≤ (li − 3)/(li − 1) < (li − 2)/(li − 1).
• If |C | = li , then again, because C is assumed to be different from Ci ∪ {i}, j has at most
li − 2 neighbors in C , so obtains utility ≤ (li − 2)/li < (li − 2)/(li − 1).
• If |C | ≥ li + 1, then j can obtain utility at most (li − 1)/(li + 1), which is worse than
(li − 2)/(li − 1) for li > 3.
Suppose G has a core-stable partition π . Consider the following partition π ′ of H :
π ′ = (π \ {{i} : i ∈ S}) ∪ {Ci ∪ {i} : i ∈ S and {i} ∈ π } ∪ {Ci : i ∈ S and {i} < π }.
Thus, supported players i ∈ S who are in a singleton coalition in π join the coalition Ci ∪ {i} in π ′.
We claim that π ′ is core-stable in H . Note first that sets of form Ci ∪ {i} are not blocking: In
this coalition, player i receives utility (li − 1)/li (which is equal to i’s subsidy) and so if Ci ∪ {i}
was blocking π ′, then {i} would be blocking π . As we have seen, the coalitions Ci are ranked
second-best for its members, who therefore do not block either. Hence no player from any Ci is
blocking. Hence any potential blocking coalition for π ′ is contained entirely in N ′, and hence
would also be a blocking coalition for π , which is a contradiction. Hence π ′ is core-stable.
Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein, Martin Olsen, and Dominik Peters 21
Suppose H has a core-stable partition π ′. First note that for each i ∈ S , either Ci ∪ {i} ∈ π ′ or
Ci ∈ π ′, since otherwise either Ci or Ci ∪ {i} blocks (by our observations about the preferences
of players j ∈ Ci above). Build the following partition π of N : if Ci ∪ {i} ∈ π ′ then put i in a
singleton in π : {i} ∈ π ; and for every S ∈ π ′ with S ⊆ N , also put S ∈ π . The result is core-stable
in G: for suppose not, and there is a blocking coalition S ⊆ N . If S = {i} is a singleton and i is
supported, then Ci ∪ {i} would block π ′. In all other cases S would also block π ′. Both cases give a
contradiction, and so π is core-stable. □
The reduction in the proof of Theorem A.4 can also be used to show that it is coNP-complete
to verify whether a given coalition structure is core-stable in a given simple symmetric FHG. We
only sketch the argument, which is by reduction from clique. Given an instance (G,k) of the clique
problem (which asks whether G contains a clique of size at least k , where we may assume that
k ≥ n2 + 2), we produce an FHG based on the same graph G, and make every vertex a supported
player with subsidy (k − 2)/(k − 1). In this game with supported players, the all-singletons coalition
structure is in the core, unless there is a clique in G of size at least k (whence the clique would
block, giving its members the payoff (k − 1)/k). The approach of Theorem A.4 can then be used to
get rid of the subsidies.
Liu and Wei [2017] give an alternative hardness proof of this problem. They show that verifying
whether the grand coalition is core stable is coNP-complete even for graphs of degree 2 and that
satisfy some further structural constraints, also by a reduction from the clique problem. Liu and
Wei [2017] also present some heuristic approaches to answer this question.
A.3 Positive results
Graphs with bounded degree
Theorem A.5. For simple and symmetric FHGs represented by graphs of degree at most 2, the core
is non-empty.
Proof. We present a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a partition in the core. The partition
is computed as follows. First keep finding K3s until no more can be found. This takes time
(n
3
)
. Let
us call the set of vertices matched into K3s as V3. We remove V3 from the graph along with E3—the
edges between vertices in V3. We then repeat the procedure by deleting K2s instead of K3s. Let
us call the set of vertices matched into pairs by V2. In that case, V \ (V2 ∪V3) are the unmatched
vertices. The partition obtained is π .
In order to prove that π is in the core, consider the potential blocking coalitions. We know that
vertices in V3 cannot be in a blocking coalition because each vertex in V3 is in its most favored
coalition. Also there does not exist a blocking coalition consisting solely of vertices fromV \(V2∪V3).
If this were the case, then we had not deleted all K2s from (V \V3,E \ E3). Now let us assume that
there exists a v2 ∈ V2 which is in a blocking coalition. A blocking coalition has to be of size 3, since
v2 has utility 1/2 in π and utility at most 1/2 in any coalition of size 2 or size at least 4. Moreover, a
blocking coalition cannot contain two vertices from V1, since for this to be the case v2 has to be
connected to one vertex in V2 and two vertices in V1, which violates the degree constraints. Hence,
the coalition is of the form {v1,v2,v ′2} where v1 ∈ V \ (V2 ∪V3) and v2,v ′2 ∈ V2. If the utility of v2
is greater than 1/2, then the utility of v ′2 is less than 1/2. Since v ′2 obtained utility 1/2 in π , {v1,v2,v ′2}
is not a blocking coalition. □
Forests
Theorem A.6. For simple and symmetric FHGs represented by undirected forests, the core is non-
empty.
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Proof. We present an algorithm to compute a partition in the core for an undirected tree.
We can assume that the graph is connected—and therefore a tree—because if it were not, then
the same algorithm for a tree could be applied to each connected component separately. Pick
an arbitrary vertex v0 ∈ V and run breadth first search on it. Let L0 consist of v0, L1 of all the
vertices at a distance of 1 from v0, and Lk of all vertices at a distance of k from v0. Let Lℓ be
the last layer of the tree. We construct a partition π , which we will later claim is in the core.
Initialize π to the empty set. For each vertex v in the second last layer Lℓ−1 which has a child in
the last layer Lℓ , add the set {v} ∪ {w :w ∈ Lℓ and {v,w} ∈ E} to π . Remove the sets of this form
{v} ∪ {w :w ∈ Lℓ and {v,w} ∈ E} from the tree and repeat the process until no more layers are
left. The partition returned is π . The procedure terminates properly. In each iteration, the last layer
of the tree is removed along with some or all the vertices of the second last layer. If a vertex is left
alone, send it to a smallest coalition that one of its neighbors is a member of.
We now prove that π is in the core. For the base case, we show that no vertex from a coalition S ∈ π
consisting of only the lowermost two layers, that is, Lℓ and Lℓ−1, can be in a blocking coalition. If
the vertex u in question is from the second last layer, then it will only be in a blocking coalition S if
S contains u, all the children of u as well as the parent of u . But then S is not a blocking coalition
for the children of u. For a leaf node v to be in a blocking coalition, it will need to be with its parent
u but in a smaller coalition. But this means that u is not in a blocking coalition. We remove all
vertices from coalitions only containing vertices from the last and second last layer and repeat the
argument inductively. □
Bakers and Millers: complete k-partite graphs
Theorem A.7. Let (N ,≿) be a Bakers and Millers game with type space Θ = {θ1, . . . ,θt } and π =
{S1, . . . , Sm} a partition. Then, π is in the strict core if and only if for all types θ ∈ Θ and all
coalitions S, S ′ ∈ π ,
|S ∩ θ |
|S | =
|S ′ ∩ θ |
|S ′ | .
Proof. First assume that for all typesθ ∈ Θ and all coalitions S and S ′ in π we have |S∩θ ||S | = |S
′∩θ |
|S ′ | ,
but that a weakly blocking coalition T for π exists. Then, |T∩θ (j) ||T | ≤ |π (j)∩θ (j) ||π (j) | for all j ∈ T , while
there is some i ∈ T with |T∩θ (i) ||T | < |π (i)∩θ (i) ||π (i) | . Consider this i . Without loss of generality assume
that θ1, . . . ,θk are the types represented in T , that is, those types θ with j ∈ θ for some j ∈ T . By
assumption we have, for all j ∈ T , |π (j)∩θ (j) ||π (j) | = |π (i)∩θ (j) ||π (i) | . Hence,
|T ∩ θ1 |
|T | + · · · +
|T ∩ θk |
|T | <
|π (i) ∩ θ1 |
|π (i)| + · · · +
|π (i) ∩ θk |
|π (i)| .
Observe that both
|T ∩ θ1 |
|T | + · · · +
|T ∩ θk |
|T | = 1
and |π (i) ∩ θ1 ||π (i)| + · · · +
|π (i) ∩ θk |
|π (i)| ≤ 1.
A contradiction follows.
For the other direction, assume that there are coalition S,T ∈ π and a type θ ∈ Θ such that
|S∩θ |
|S | >
|T∩θ |
|T | . Then, S ∩ θ , ∅ and let i ∈ S ∩ θ . As
|S ∩ θ1 |
|S | + · · · +
|S ∩ θt |
|S | =
|T ∩ θ1 |
|T | + · · · +
|T ∩ θt |
|T | ,
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there is some type θ ′ ∈ Θ such that |S∩θ ′ ||S | < |T∩θ
′ |
|T | . Accordingly, T ∩ θ ′ , ∅.
First consider the case in which both S ∩ θ ′ = ∅ and T ∩ θ = ∅. Without loss of generality, we
may assume that |S | ≤ |T |. Observe that |S | < |T ∪ {i}|. The coalitionT ∪ {i} is weakly blocking, as
|(T ∪ {i}) ∩ θ |
|T ∪ {i}| =
|{i}|
|T ∪ {i}| <
|{i}|
|S | ≤
|S ∩ θ |
|S |
and |(T ∪ {i}) ∩ θ ′′ |
|T ∪ {i}| =
|T ∩ θ ′′ |
|T ∪ {i}| ≤
|T ∩ θ ′′ |
|T |
for every type θ ′′ distinct from θ . (The latter inequality is not strict, as T ∩ θ ′′ may be empty.)
Finally, assume without loss of generality, that T ∩ θ , ∅ and let j ∈ T ∩ θ . Since S and T are
distinct and both in π , also i , j . We show that the coalitionT ′ = (T \ {j}) ∪ {i} is weakly blocking.
Consider an arbitrary type θ ′′ ∈ Θ. Observe that |T | = |T ′ | and |T ∩ θ ′′ | = |T ′ ∩ θ ′′ |, whether
θ ′′ = θ or not. Therefore, |T∩θ
′′ |
|T | =
|T ′∩θ ′′ |
|T ′ | . Accordingly, every player k ∈ T \ {i, j} is indifferent
between T and T ′. To conclude the proof, observe that |T
′∩θ |
|T ′ | =
|π (j)∩θ |
|T | . Hence,
|π (i) ∩ θ (i)|
|S | =
|S ∩ θ |
|S | >
|T ∩ θ |
|T | =
|π (j) ∩ θ |
|T | =
|T ′ ∩ θ |
|T ′ | ,
that is, T ′ ≻i S , as desired. □
Graphs with large girth
We say that two vertices v andw have a neighbor in common in (V ,E) if either {v,w} ∈ E or there
is some u ∈ V such that {u,v}, {u,w} ∈ E. This notion allows a useful characterization of graphs
with girth of at least five.
Lemma A.8. Let (V ,E) be a graph with |V | ≥ 3. Then, (V ,E) has girth of at least five if and only if
all distinct v,w ∈ V have at most one neighbor in common.
Proof. For the if direction, assume that (V ,E) contains a cycle of length three or four. In either
case, it is easy to find vertices that have at least two neighbors in common. For the only-if direction,
assume that there are v,w ∈ V that have more than one neighbor in common. That is, either
{v,w} ∈ V and there is some u ∈ V such that {u,v}, {u,w} ∈ V or there are u,u ′ ∈ V such that
{u,v}, {u,w}, {u ′,v}, {u ′,w} ∈ V . If the former, the graph has girth of at most three. If the latter,
the graph’s girth is at most four. □
Theorem A.9. For simple and symmetric FHGs represented by graphs with girth at least five, the
core is non-empty.
Proof. The reader is referred to Figure 7 for a graphical illustration of certain aspects of its
proof.
We first introduce the more general notion of graph packing. Let F be a set of connected
undirected graphs. An F -packing of a graphG is a subgraphH ofG such that each component ofH
is isomorphic to a member of F . The components of an F -packing H can be seen as coalitions,
and thus F -packings naturally induce a coalition partition, with each vertex not contained in a
connected component forming a singleton coalition. We will consider star-packings of graphs, that
is, F -packings with F = {S2, S3, S4, . . . , } such that each Si is a star with i vertices. Each star Si
with i > 2 has one center c and i − 1 leaves ℓ1, . . . , ℓi−1. We view S2 as having two centers and no
leaves.
We will prove that a star packing that maximizes leximin welfare is core stable. Formally, with
each star packing, denoted by π , we associate an objective vector ®x(π ) = (x1, . . . ,x |V |) such that
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xi ≤ x j if 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ |V |, and there is a bijection f : V → {1, . . . , |V |} with uv (π ) = xf (v). Thus, in
®x(π ) the vertices/players are ordered according to their value for π in ascending order. We assume
these objective vectors to be ordered lexicographically by ≥, e.g., ( 12 , 12 , 12 , 12 ) ≥ (0, 13 , 13 , 23 ) but not
vice versa. The goal is to compute a star packing that maximizes its objective vector. Intuitively,
this balances the sizes of the stars in the star packing and does not leave vertices needlessly on their
own. Clearly, star packings maximizing the objective are guaranteed to exist and in the remainder
of the proof we argue that such star packings are in the core.
Observe first that every graph (V ,E) admits a star packing such that every vertex which is not
isolated (that is, which has a neighbor) is contained in some star Si for i ≥ 2. This can be seen
by considering a spanning forest. Thus, every star packing of (V ,E) that maximizes the objective
vector must have this property.
Now, let π be a star packing of a graph (V ,E) that maximizes the objective vector. For a con-
tradiction, assume that there is a coalition S blocking π . Then, S contains no isolated vertices,
as these always obtain utility 0 and can thus not be strictly better off in S . Therefore, S consists
entirely of vertices that are either centers or leaves of π . Also observe that, for any two leaves ℓ, ℓ′
in π we have {ℓ, ℓ′} < E. For a contradiction assume that there were such leaves ℓ, ℓ′. Then, ℓ
and ℓ′ must come from different centers, otherwise (V ,E) would contain a triangle. Moreover,
π ′ = {{ℓ, ℓ′},π ′1 . . . ,π ′k }, where π ′i = πi \ {ℓ, ℓ′}, is a star packing for which the objective vector is
larger than the one for π , because all leaves in π obtain weakly higher utility in π ′, and ℓ and ℓ′
obtain strictly higher utility.
Now three cases can be distinguished: (i) S contains no centers of π , (ii) S contains exactly one
center of π and (iii) S contains more than one center of π .
If (i), S only contains leaves of π , between which we know there are no edges. Hence, every
member of S has utility 0 and S cannot be blocking.
If (ii), we show that ®x(π ) is not optimal. Let S consists of one center c andm leaves ℓ1, . . . , ℓm of
π . Since no leaves in π are neighbors, and S does not contain isolated vertices, S must be a star
with c as center and ℓ1, . . . , ℓm as leaves. Let ℓ denote one of the leaves and c ′ the center of π such
that ℓ ∈ π (c ′). Consider the partition π ′ such that
π ′(k) =
{
π (c) ∪ {ℓ} if k ∈ π (c) ∪ {ℓ}, and
π (k) \ {ℓ} otherwise.
We claim that ®x(π ′) > ®x(π ), contradicting our initial assumption. Observe that it suffices to prove
that (a) uℓ(π ′) > uℓ(π ) and (b) uk (π ′) ≥ uℓ(π ′) for all k with uk (π ′) < uk (π ).
For (a), observe that if uc (π ) < uc (S) and c is a center in both π and S , then |π (c) |−1|π (c) | < |S |−1|S | .
Moreover, uℓ(π ) < uℓ(S), that is, 1|π (ℓ) | < 1|S | . Accordingly, |π (c)| < |S | < |π (ℓ)|. It follows that
|π ′(ℓ)| = |π (c) ∪ {ℓ}| ≤ S < |π (ℓ)| and thus uℓ(π ′) > uℓ(π ).
For (b), let k be such that uk (π ′) < uk (π ). Then either k = c ′ or k ∈ π (c) \ {c}. As c ′ is a center
and ℓ a leaf in π , c ′ still is a center in π ′. Hence, uc ′(π ′) ≥ 12 . Moreover, ℓ is also a leaf in π and
thus uℓ(π ′) < 12 , proving the case. Now assume that k ∈ π (c) \ {c}. Then, with k and ℓ being both
leaves in π ′(c), uk (π ′) = uℓ(π ′).
If (iii), assume that S contains at least two centers c and c ′ in π . Then, uc (π ) ≥ 12 and uc ′(π ) ≥ 12 .
Either |S | = 2k + 2 or |S | = 2k + 3 for some k ≥ 1. As both uc (S) > 12 and uc ′(S) > 12 , also|{i ∈ S : {c, i} ∈ E}| ≥ k + 2 and |{i ∈ S : {c ′, i} ∈ E}| ≥ k + 2. It follows that c and c ′ must have at
least two neighbors in common, contradicting Lemma A.8. This completes the proof. □
The procedure described in the proof above does not immediately yield a polynomial time
algorithm that produces a core stable partition, since it is unclear whether a leximin star packing
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Fig. 7. A graph with girth 5 and a star packing indicated by the solid edges. This star packing does not have
an optimal objective vector: a better one would result if ℓ3 and ℓ8 were to form a star. Note that {ℓ3, ℓ8} is a
blocking coalition.
can be found in polynomial time. However, inspecting the proof further, we see that we in fact only
need a local optimum.
Theorem A.10. For simple and symmetric FHGs represented by graphs with girth at least five, an
element of the core can be found in polynomial time.
Proof. The existence proof above showed that if a given star packing π is blocked by some
coalition, then there exists a leximin-better star packing π ′ that could be obtained from π in one of
the following two ways:
(a) two leaves ℓ, ℓ′ from different stars in π with {ℓ, ℓ′} ∈ E are removed from their respective
coalitions and form the new star {ℓ, ℓ′}, or
(b) a leaf ℓ is moved from one star to another.
Our algorithm now proceeds as follows: start by producing some star packing ofG in which every
non-isolated vertex is in a star (such a star packing can be found by considering a spanning forest
of G). Then improve this star packing by using operations (a) and (b) if they lead to a leximin
improvement, until no more such opportunities are available. The resulting star packing is in the
core by the argument in the existence proof above.
It remains to analyze the runtime of this algorithm. Clearly, the initial step and each improvement
step can be executed in polynomial time, so we only need to establish that the algorithm terminates
after a polynomial number of improvement steps.
Define the following potential function for each star packing π :
Φ(π ) =
∑
i ∈V center
|V | +
∑
i ∈V leaf
|V | − |π (i)|.
Note that this potential function is integral, non-negative, and bounded above by |V |2. We show
that every time we perform (a) or (b), the potential strictly increases. This implies that at most |V |2
improvement steps will be required.
If we perform (a), then we convert two leaves ℓ and ℓ′ into centers and thereby strictly increase
their contribution to Φ. We also decrease the sizes of the stars that ℓ and ℓ′ were part of in π , which
increases the contributions to Φ of the remaining leaves in those stars. Everyone else’s contribution
stays fixed.
If we perform (b), using the notation of the previous proof, we move ℓ from π (c ′) to π (c). Since
by case (ii)(a) of that proof we thereby increase the utility of ℓ, the leaf ℓ has moved from a large
star to a smaller star; in particular |π (c ′)| ≥ |π (c)| + 2. After the move of ℓ, the contributions to Φ of
the leaves of π (c ′) have each increased by 1, and the contributions of leaves of π (c) have decreased
by 1. Since there are more of the former than of the latter, this is an overall strict improvement. □
